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CoMMPN INTEREST IN SuB-

JECT MATTER - Attorneys for plaintiff wrote a letter to a bus company claiming damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of the bus company.
This letter was referred to the insurer of the bus company. Insurer, in reply,
wrote a letter charging the plaintiff with an attempt to defraud, calling him
a shyster lawyer, and making other disparaging remarks. Although intended
for the bus company, this letter was inadvertently sent to plaintiff's attorneys.
In a libel action brought against the bus company and the insurance company,
the defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that the communication was privileged. Held, between the defendants there was privilege, but the privilege did
not extend to a communication sent to plaintiff's attorneys. Love v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., (D. C. Miss. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 481.
The instant court decided that a privilege existed between the bus company
and the insurance company, due to a mutual interest. A privilegeexists,ithas been
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said, "where it is the duty of the defendant to make a communication to another
person who has an interest in the subject matter of the communication or some
duty in connection with it," or "where the defendant has an interest in the
subject matter of the communication, and the person to whom the communication is made has a corresponding interest or some duty in connection with the
matter." 1 Clearly the insurance company and the bus company were within
the area protected by this privilege. But the privilege is a conditional one, and its
protection may be lost by excessive publication ( as, for example, publication to
one who has no interest to protect), 2 or by the addition of defamatory matter
which is not relevant to the interest which creates the privilege.3 Proof of
malicious intent in making the statement will destroy the protection given by
the privilege. 4 In a libel action plaintiff is compensated only for injury to his
reputation,5 and before his reputation can be injured there must be a defamatory
publication to a third party. 6 Communication to the plaintiff himself does not
injure his reputation. 7 In the instant case the comunication was made to plaintiff's attorneys, authorized to handle his negligence claim. While the plaintiff's
attorneys were outside the limits of the existing privilege, it is arguable that there
was no liability because of the absence of publication. Cases have held that where
an attorney-client relation exists, and the attorneys make demands in carrying
out their authority, the client has authorized his attorneys to receive answering
1
ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER, 6th ed., 206 (1929). The same author, in discussing the second type of privilege, quotes the rule as stated by Lord Escher, M. R.,
in Hunt v. Great Northern Ry., [1891] 2 Q. B. 189 at 191: "If the communication
was of such a nature that it could be fairly said that those who made it had an interest
in making such a communication and those to whom it was made had a corresponding
_·interest in having it made to them • • • the occasion is a privileged one, and the
question whether it was or was not misused is an entirely different one." See also
HARPER, ToRTS, § 249 (1933); l CooLEY, ToRTS, 4th ed.,§ 159 (1932); 3 ToRTS
RESTATEMENT, §§ 594, 595 (1938); Stroud v. Harris, (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) 5 F.
(2d) 25; 17 R. C. L. 341 (1917).
2
Kruse v. Rabe, So N. J. L. 378, 79 A. 316, Ann. Cas. 1912A 477 at 479
(19II); Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Renno, 173 Miss. 609, 157 So. 705 (1934); Sullivan v. Strathan-Hutton-Evans Commission Co., 152 Mo. 268, 53 S. W. 912 (1899);
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 7II, 98 P. 281 (1908); 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361
(1909).
8
Sullivan v. Strathan-Hutton-Evans Commission Co., 152 Mo. 268, 53 S. W •
. 912 (1899); Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477,140 S. W. 257,
Ann. Cas. 1913C 613 at 617, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 449 (19II).
4
Stroud v. Harris, (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) 5 F. (2d) 25; Rosenberg v. Mason,
157 Va. 215, 160 S. E. 190 (1931); Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass. 171, 107 N. E. 620
(1915); Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 229 Mo. App. 371, So S. W. (2d) 286
(1935); Forsythe v. Durham, 270 N. Y. 141, 200 N. E. 674 (1936); Fahr v. Hayes,
50 N. J. L. 275, 13 A. 261 (1888).
.
11
HARPER, TORTS, § 235 (1933).
• Youmans v. Smith, 153 N. Y. 214, 47 N. E. 265 (1897); Freeman v. Dayton
Scale Co., 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S. W. (2d) 255 (1929); Dickinson v. Hathaway, 122
La. 644, 48 So. 136, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33 (1909); Terwilliger v. Wands, 17
N. Y. 54 (1858).
1
Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54 (1858).
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communications.8 Such answers, if defamatory, do not constitute a publication
any more than if sent to the plaintiff himself. 9 Following these cases, a reply
by the bus company to plaintiff's attorneys would not constitute a publication.
Certainly the bus company had a right to write to the attorneys denying liability.
It seems logical to say that the insurance company, on behalf of the bus company,
should have a similar right. If a right existed to communicate directly, it is hard
to see how it was lost in making inadvertent indirect communication.

8
Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co., 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S. W. (2d) 255 (1929),
commented upon in 28 M1cH. L. REv. 348 (1930); Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corp.,
212 App. Div. 366, 208 N. Y. S. 625 (1925); In re Bogart, 215 App. Div. 45, 213
N. Y. S. 137 (1925); Dickinson v. Hathaway, 122 La. 644, 48 So. 136 (1909).
9
Dickinson v. Hathaway, 122 La. 644, 48 So. 136 (1909); Freeman v. Dayton
Scale Co., 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S. W. (2d) 255 (1929); Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corp.,
212 App. Div. 366, 208 N. Y. S. 625 (1925).

